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THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
MILTON

A.

KALLIS*

T

HE present era is one of rapid change. To meet the demands of new political, economic, and social conditions
certain practical adjustments must be made. We have accordingly seen a remarkable expansion of governmental agencies
in the field of public administration. As a result, the subject of
administrative law has for more than a generation been the
fastest growing part of our legal system. Moreover, it presents vital problems which today are pressing for a wellinformed and intelligent solution.'
Because the subject is still in a formative stage, the
courts have ample opportunity for displaying judicial statesmanship in deciding the difficult questions involved.' Instead
of being slaves to precedent, they can draw on the lessons of
history and at the same time use the tools of analysis and
understanding to satisfy the needs of the people and to help
maintain a stable and yet progressive nation.'
THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN

GOVERNMENT

As life becomes more complex the processes of government increase. In simple society they are vested in a tribal
*Member of Illinois Bar; Ph. B., University of Chicago; A.M., George Washington University; LL.B., Northwestern University; S.J.D., Harvard University;
former Lecturer in Illinois Law, Northwestern University School of Law; former
Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
1 In an address, "Modern Tendencies and the Law," delivered before the
American Bar Association in 1933, Attorney General Homer S. Cummings said,
"The field of administrative law, already clouded by much uncertainty, is being
widely extended. The functions and limitations of the various departments and
agencies of government have been taking on new aspects; and the attainment of
administrative unity in this vast complex of powers presents a fascinating prob.
lem." 19 A.B.A.J. 576 at 578.
2 See F. Frankfurter, "A Symposium on Administrative Law Based upon
Legal Writing 1931-33," 18 Iowa L. Rev. 129.
s "The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical
progression; this I will call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy;
along the line of historical development; this I will call the method of evolution;
along the. line of the customs of the community; this I will call the method of
tradition; along the lines of Justice, morals and social welfare, the mores of the
day; and this I will call the method of sociology." B. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process, 30.
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chief and his council of wise and trusted men. With the growth
of civilization, they gradually become distributed among what
are generally considered to be so-called legislative, executive,
and judicial organs of the state. This division of activities
leads to a specialization of function and to the origin and development of rules of procedure and technique peculiar to
each. Some independence among the different political agencies naturally results. However, there exist a certain interrelation and interaction as well.
The foregoing facts focus our attention on two notable
features which have emerged from the inconstancy of our
present-day institutions. We have witnessed an unprecedented assumption by the government of activities which formerly were regarded as entirely within the purview of private affairs.' Many administrative agencies, therefore, have
been created which partake of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions. A canvass of the laws of the national government and of the average state readily demonstrates how
closely related to the public welfare they are. 5 In addition, the
last thirty years have been marked by a prodigious rise and
growth of administrative tribunals. Although technically not
courts in the constitutional sense, they nevertheless are invested with extensive authority in adjudicating matters of
vital concern to individuals. 6
4 This point is lucidly developed by Frankfurter in his "The Public and its
Government."
5 See Roscoe Pound, "Organization of Courts," an address originally delivered
in 1913 and republished in 11 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 69; A. A. Berle, Jr., "The Expansion of American Administrative Law," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 430; Charles E. Hughes,
"The Republic after the War," 53 Am. L. Rev. 661; Guthrie, Presidential Address
New York State Bar Association, 46 Rep. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n 169; Roscoe Pound,
"The Crisis in American Law," 10 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 5; F. Frankfurter, "The Task
of Administrative Law," 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 614; M. Rosenberry, "Administrative
Law and the Constitution," 23 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 32; Haines, "Effects of the
Growth of Administrative Law," 26 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 876.
6 In 1926 there were seventy-eight provisions in the Illinois statutes vesting in
nonjudicial officers authority to determine or control private rights. They might
roughly be classified according to professions and trades, public health, public
utilities, safety of investing public and creditors generally, agriculture, and
miscellaneous. Since then the number has materially increased, mostly in the
fields of labor, old age assistance, occupational disease, and unemployment
problems. The Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association in 1934 tentatively enumerated the federal administrative tribunals
(emphasis being laid on those agencies to which judicial powers have been delegated). See 59 Rep. A.B.A. 556-560. Chief Justice Rosenberry of Wisconsin has
listed fifty-five different types of administrative tribunals exercising so-called
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. M. Rosenberry, "Administrative
Law and the Constitution," 23 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 32 at 39.
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There are certain practical reasons for these administrative bodies. Although they have often been attacked for usurping powers properly belonging to the judiciary, the courts
have usually sustained their use of these powers subject to
certain safeguards. Thus they have been upheld on the ground
either that they are common-law exceptions to the rule that
adjudication is basically a judicial function or that they are
new devices created to cope with the problems of a civilization which becomes increasingly more complex. In consequence, there is a crying demand for quick and efficient administration in matters requiring specialization of training
7
and knowledge in certain factual situations.
THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

We are now facing what is perhaps the most critical problem in administrative law. For many years the question of
the scope of judicial review and control of administrative
agencies has caused much confusion. There has been a vast
difference of opinion on this subject, and the Supreme Court
has recently had occasion to express itself on certain aspects
thereof. As a result, a bitter debate has taken place between
persons who maintain the traditional attitude of the supremacy of law and those who see these new organs of government
as genuine aids to the legislative and executive departments
in furtherance of the democratic principle.'
THE SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS

To understand the problems involved in the question of
judicial review, we can profitably turn to the doctrine of the
7 See Roscoe Pound, "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," 44
Rep. A.B.A. 445.
8 Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Rep. A.B.A. 155, 331;
De Nike, "The Businessman's' Stake in Judicial Review," 17 Harv. Bus. Rev.
40;, Gregory Hankin, "The Logan Bill," 27 Ky. L. J. 3; Conference on Administrative Law and the Administrative Process, National Lawyers Guild held on
January 21 and 22, 1939, in Washington, D.C. (soon to be published); N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1938, p. 33, col. 1, for the intense struggle over judicial review of administrative action which developed last year in the New York State Constitutional Convention. For the attitude of the people of New York, see id., Dec. 9,
1938, p. 4, col. 4. See also Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 at 19, 20, 58
S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 1129 (1938); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936); Roscoe Pound, "The Future of Law,"
47 Yale L. J. 1, 2, 7; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, "The Place of the Administrative Tribunal in our Legal System," 24 A.B.A.J. 267; Roscoe Pound, "The Constitution:
Its Development, Adaptability, and Future," 23 A.B.A.J. 739; Jackson, Founders'
Day Address, University of North Carolina (1937).
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separation of powers, not as a technical rule of constitutional
law, but as a political maxim.' The Founding Fathers so considered it; and in dividing the powers they were not primarily
concerned with efficiency in government, but with safeguarding against tyranny. The limitation was designed to create
checks and balances indispensable to the security of the people against political despotism. Jefferson once observed that
'1a single consolidated government would become the most
corrupt government on earth." Woodrow Wilson expressed
the same thought when he said, "The history of liberty is the
history of divided power."
The federal and state constitutions do not define the
terms legislative, executive, and judicial. In approaching
possible definitions, we should understand that government
is not an exact science and that political agencies do not function automatically. If effective work by our public officials
be realized, a certain blending as well as separation of functions is desirable. We see this in legislative impeachments,
executive vetoes, and judicial declarations of unconstitutionality. The difficulty of effecting even theoretical separation of
powers is universally recognized. 10 Accordingly, legislatures
have adjudicated contempt charges, divorce cases, election
contests, and claims against the government, and have also
exercised many functions which are considered executive
acts, such as organizing corporations. Obviously they must
construe constitutions when they enact statutes. The executive department, in hearing cases involving workmen's compensation, revocation of various kinds of licenses, and removal of persons in the civil service, must know and interpret
the law." The judiciary enforces the law by its power to hold
in contempt and to issue writs of execution and other judicial
9 In the Federalist (No. XLVII), Madison refers to the doctrine of separation
of powers as a "political maxim." For the same attitude expressed by the
United States Supreme Court, see F. Frankfurter and J. M. Landis, "Powers of
Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010 at 1012-16.
10 Mr. Justice Cardozo has put the situation in apt language: "But hereafter, as
before, the changing combinations of events will beat upon the walls of ancient
categories. 'Life has relations not capable of division into inflexible compartments. The moulds expand and shrink.' " B. Cardozo, The Growth of Law, 19.
11 This fact is readily exemplified by actions for divorce and for workmen's
compensation. Neither existed at common law and both are entirely the
creatures of statute. Yet, although the -law applicable to the latter is much
more technical than the former, divorces are perhaps invariably adjudicated
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process. Moreover, it declares a rule of law applicable to the
case at bar where none already exists.
All departments exercise some judgment and discretion
in the performance of their duties. Furthermore, to decide,
investigate, and deliberate is not necessarily a judicial function, because many executive officers must frequently render
decisions on the law after hearing evidence on the facts. "But
it is not sufficient to bring such matters under the judicial
power, that they involve the exercise of judgment upon law
and fact.'

12

Analytically, the courts have not furnished any absolute
tests for legislative, executive, or judicial functions. 13 Generally the basis of decision was either legal history or public
policy. We can, however, generalize to some extent.
Constitutions are limitations on the legislative, and grants
to the executive and judicial, arms of the government."4 A
by courts, while compensation cases are usually heard in the first instance by
an administrative tribunal.
12 Mr. Justice Curtis for the Supreme Court in Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 at 280, 15 L. Ed. 372 at 376 (1856), where he also said,
"That the auditing of the accounts of a receiver of public money may be, in
an enlarged sense, a judicial act, must be admitted. So are all those administrative duties the performance of which involves an inquiry into the existence of
facts and the application to them of rules of law." See also Clarence N. Goodwin
in 59 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 149 (1934): "The finding of facts . . . is not a judicial
function nor does it constitute in any true sense judicial action. It is a process
gone through with not merely by every administrative agency, but by every
person or group called upon to perform any function or transact any business,
public or private, and it is incidental to the routine of our daily lives. That it
is made the basis of governmental action does not make it judicial in its nature.
The interpretation of the law and the construction of statutes are not judicial
functions. Bodies, politic and private, as well as public officials and private
individuals are required constantly to make such construction and interpretation
both in the performance of public functions and in private business. Again we
must say that the fact that such interpretation or construction is necessary to
the performance of the official function does not make it judicial in its nature."
See also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 at 307, 34 S. Ct. 48, 58
L. Ed. 229 (1913).
13 See Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), I, 177, for
citations in support of this point.
14 J. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in United
States, p. 21; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 at 226, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53
L. Ed. 150 at 158 (1908), where Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court,
said, "A judicial inquiry investigates, deplares, and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws aipposed already to exist. That is
its purpose and end. Legislation . . . looks to the future and changes existing
conditions by making a new rule to be. applied thereafter to all or some part of
those subject to its power."
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legislature, accordingly, can do anything that is not prohibited by the supreme law of the state and the nation and,
within the limits imposed by these instruments, can act on
any subject within the scope of civil government. This power,
in the absence of a constitutional prohibition, even extends
to such retroactive statutes as bills of attainder, ex post facto
laws, and validating acts. Although a legislature can pass a
particular, local, or special law to deal with a past situation,
it ordinarily enacts statutes to operate in the future and to
take effect not upon certain specified individuals but generally. "What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is
that the former affects the rights of individuals in the abstract
and must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal
position of any particular individual will be definitely touched
by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals
in their individual capacity."'" It is not required to give notice
or hearing and does not publicly announce the reasons for
its acts. Furthermore, it consists of a large, sometimes unwieldy body of men from all walks of life who are not by previous experience or education necessarily trained for their
legislative duties. Principles of politics rather than those of
law lie at the foundation of their work.
The executive is concerned with applying, enforcing, and
carrying into effect the law. To do this properly, he must,
of course, know the law applicable to his functions, but he
is more frequently occupied in ascertaining facts and using
his discretion. This does not so much involve the use of legal
doctrine as it does personal judgment requiring experience
with factual situations. These are so distinctively individual
that they cannot or, for the sake of good government, should
not be encompassed with a particularized and minutely detailed rule of law. Every combination of facts may be different from every other. 16 The essence of the duties of the
15 J. Dickinson in his Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in
United States (1927) on page 168 discusses the difficulty of distinguishing between
"questions of law" and "questions of fact."
16 "Preliminary resort to the commission is required . . . because the inquiry
is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters, and uniformity
can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission. Moreover,
that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance is commonly found
only in a body of experts." Mr. Justice Brandeis in Great Northern R. Co. v.
Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943 (1922).
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executive department is to deal with problems which require
the use of discretion, special knowledge, and training in a
busy workaday world-matters outside the ambit of jurisprudence.1 7 When an administrative official makes rules and
regulations, as he often must, he does so subject always to
the paramount policy or will of the legislature as manifested
in the statutes. When he performs his adjudicative functions,
which are held to be the exercise of non-judicial authority,
he is merely effectuating a legislative purpose.
A definition of the judicial function is not easy to frame,
because in many respects it closely resembles that of administrative adjudication. A court consists of a small body
of professionally and technically trained and experienced
men,18 who, by the use of authoritative legal materials, adjust past or present situations when disposing of justiciable
cases or controversies between antagonistic parties whose
existing interests are adverse 9 and will be finally affected
by the order, judgment, finding, or decree entered, subject
to no review, revision, or reversal by any non-judicial officers.
A court, moreover, can, at least to a certain extent, enforce
such order without the aid of another department and, with
some exceptions, is the only agency of government which
can impose penalties and forfeitures. It is immaterial that
in the performance of its duties it may be laying down a rule
for the future guidance of the bench, bar, and public. In the
judicial process, ample notice and hearing are given, 20 and
reasons for the decisions are stated in publicly announced
opinions, 21 no one but the parties themselves being affected
by the proceedings. The judicial power, according to the mass
17 "Preliminary resort to the Commission is required . . . because the inquiry
is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters, and uniformity
can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission. Moreover,
that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance is commonly found
only in a body of experts." Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Great Northern R. Co. v.
Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943 (1922).
18 William A. Robson in his book, Justice and Administrative Law, in Chapters
V and VI elaborates the legal training of judges and technical training of administrative officials.
19 Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed.
730 (1933).
20 Fidelity Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 47 S. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed..
959 (1927).
21 Roscoe Pound, "Justice According to Law," 14 Col. L. Rev. 103 at 108-9.
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of decisions interpreting the separation of powers clause,
embraces every kind of jurisdiction, activity, or authority
seen in the courts of England when our Federal Constitution
was adopted. Generally what these tribunals did before 1789
the courts in this country under the judicial power can do.
Its essence is to adjudicate legal rights of individuals based
on the common law and equity, with the power to enforce
its acts, to inflict penalties for violations of the law, and to
declare with authoritative finality what the law is or was in
any dispute properly before it. If the vested rights in question
are not those traditionally included in the common law or
equity, but have been created since, or are merely additional
privileges or new legal rights conferred by the government,
or if they concern the latter in its corporate capacity or in its
exercise of police power, then it is not always obligatory,
though it is legally permissible, that a judicial tribunal, as
contrasted with an administrative agency, have jurisdiction. 22 "Whenever the law provides a remedy enforceable in
the courts according to the regular course of legal procedure,
and that remedy is pursued, there arises a case within the
meaning of the constitution, whether the subject of the litigation be property or status.

'23

LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL ACTION

A vital factor in determining the proper scope of judicial

review of administrative decisions is the functional ability
of judicial tribunals. There are certain practical limitations

on what courts in fact can do. They arise out of the nature of
the judicial process, rather than constitutional prohibitions.
Where a court cannot adequately protect or give effect to all

the interests involved in a case before it or where the judicial
machinery is unsuited for rendering justice as the 24facts require, judges should refrain from hearing the case.
Another reason for judicial self-restraint is that courts
22

Powell, "Separation of Powers: Administrative Exercise of Legislative and

Judicial Power," 27 Pol Sci. Quart. 215 at 238; Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751, 77 L. Ed. 1372 (1933).
23 Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 46 S. Ct. 425, 70 L. Ed. 738 (1926).
24 See the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 at 248, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211 at 224 (1918), and
in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 at 605, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117
at 1135 (1923); M. Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338.
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are usually more detached from every-day life than are
certain administrative officials. Being freed from the bonds
of purely technical rules of evidence, having familiarity with
the problems peculiar to the particular type of agency, feeling the pulse of public opinion for the time being, and working with directness and speed, an administrative body can
sometimes act within the law with a degree of effectiveness
not possible to judicial tribunals. On the other hand, there
are defects in the administrative process. Lacking forms
and rules in some instances, they are not compelled to deliberate and occasionally do not guard against suggestion, impulse, and political pressure.25
JUDICIAL PRESUMPTIONS FAVORING ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

We have seen that if the judicial function has any distinctively individual characteristic it is the unique attribute
of final, but not necessarily initial, determination of legal
disputes as to both so-called questions of "law" and of "fact."
With regard to the latter, the court has the last decision because law is clothed with facts. The question now arises as
to the extent to which the courts review the decisions of
administrative bodies. With regard to a purely factual situation, there is no reason for preferring a court's reaction to
that of an administrative agency. On this account, a certain
presumption of correctness should attach to the latter's finding of fact. Accordingly, a court should not substitute its
own judgment for that of an administrative tribunal when
the application of a legal standard is involved.2 6 Hence it is
not a denial of due process of law for a court to give the same
weight to a commission as it would to a lower court where
the requisites of notice, hearing, and other relevant factors
are present. Where the narrow line between possible confiscation and proper regulation presents a reasonable difference of opinion, the court should not set aside the order of
25 "Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiarly
exposed to political demands. Some may be expert and impartial, other subservient." Chief Justice Hughes for the court in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38 at 52, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 at 1041 (1936).
26 For an instance of the application of a standard and the substitution by a
reviewing court of its own judgment for that of the administrative agency, see
Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 50 S. Ct. 1, 74 L. Ed. 138 (1929).
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the commission.2 7 It has been held in connection with appellate review of trial court proceedings that even where the
facts are admitted but where a difference of opinion as to the
inference that may legitimately be drawn from them exists,
it is the province of the jury and not the court to draw the inference.28 The same weight and respect should be accorded
an administrative body.
Another determining fact in the exercise of judicial review is the difficulty which courts sometimes have in examining the facts presented to an administrative commission.
Quite often the record of the proceedings is too large for the
court to examine intelligently with the limited time at its
disposal. In one case, for example, a suit to enjoin a public
utility rate as confiscatory, the record before the master in
chancery comprised twenty-one volumes of testimony and
proceedings.2
METHODS OF PRESENTING FACTS TO A COURT

There are various ways of presenting the facts to a court.
One is upon the record of proceedings before the administrative body. Another is the trial of the case de novo. With respect to disputes involving jurisdictional facts where constitutional rights are involved the United States Supreme Court
has sustained the right to a retrial in the court with a disregard of the testimony before the commission."0 It is not ap27 "Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of
facts, the courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them
contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the facts
establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set
up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the law maker." Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292 at 294, 44 S. Ct. 325, 68 L. Ed. 690 at 694 (1924).
28 Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 50 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 720 (1930); Richmond
& D. R.R. Co. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 13 S. Ct. 774, 37 L. Ed. 642 (1893); C. & N.
W. R. Co. v. Hansen, 166 Ill.623, 46 N.E. 1071 (1897); Moore v. Rosenmond, 238
N.Y. 356, 144 N.E. 639 (1924).
29 Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 42 S. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538
(1921); see also Akron, C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 184, 43 S. Ct. 270,
67 L. Ed. 605 (1923).
80 In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 64, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1934),
Chief Justice Hughes for the court said, "We think that the essential independence
of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement of
constitutional rights requires that the Federal court should determine such an
issue upon its own record and the facts elicited before it." See also St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
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parent why the court should have to find the facts on a new
record. Unless some special reason exists, it can examine
the facts found by the commission on the record made before
the latter. Even here it may be queried whether Mr. Justice
Brandeis has been entirely consistent in his attitude. Although
he dissented from the requirement of a trial de novo in
Crowell v. Benson,8 which involved an application for compensation for a maritime employee, yet in deportation proceedings he held that citizenship was a fact to be found by
judicial process.2 It is not apparent on what he based his
distinction, for in each instance legal rights were involved.
To say that one is statutory and the other is constitutional
furnishes no answer, because not only the constitution but
all laws and treaties made pursuant to it have the status of
supreme law. Perhaps a difference of degree or type of legal
interest secured is the controlling feature. An analysis of the
decisions, however, hardly gives a workable criterion when
problems of judicial review are presented.
Concerning the judicial determination of questions of
fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has obtained
its information in various ways. Sometimes when the validity
of legislative or executive action depended on the facts involved, the court dealt with this question just as an ordinary
question of law. Thus it assumed that the matter did not depend upon the facts but on reasoning or judicial precedent.3
On the other hand, it has obtained its information by taking
4
judicial notice of materials incorporated in appellate briefs.
At times the court has accepted evidence submitted at administrative proceedings or judicial trials relating to underlying questions of fact. On many occasions it has announced
that legislative declarations as to the facts are entitled to
great respect by courts. Likewise, the facts embodied in
reports by committees in charge of bills have been accorded
considerable weight, and the court has shown much defer31 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1934).
82 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938 (1922).

33 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819); Legal Tender Cases, 12
Wall. 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871).
34 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908); Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435, 61 L. Ed. 830 (1917); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923).
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ence to findings of fact by state supreme courts8.

By analogy,

a court should follow the same policy when it reviews a decision of an administrative body. Ordinarily all of the elements of deliberation, discretion, good faith, investigation,
notice, hearing, and evidence which have been presumed by
the Supreme Court as having accompanied legislative or
other judicial action should be considered likewise to have
attended the activities of administrative agencies. 6
METHODS AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

In defining the scope of judicial review of administrative
decisions, we conclude that the old categories of review are
satisfactory. The well established principles of common law
and equity permit judicial review of administrative action
when questions of jurisdiction or abuse of power are involved.
Thus, an independent attack can be made directly on administrative decisions by mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, tax-payer's bill,
and other specifically provided statutory proceedings. Moreover, a finding of an administrative body may be indirectly
questioned when it is the basis of a suit between two persons.
In addition to the foregoing direct and indirect independent
attacks, there can be a true review by courts of administrative decisions. One instance is seen when the commission
applies to the court for the enforcement of its order or finding. The same situation also applies where a statute provides
for some kind of proceedings by way of appeal or writ of
error. In either of these instances the court may conceivably
consider for itself three points. Being a judicial tribunal and
therefore the official and final arbiter in controversies as to
what the law is, it must necessarily examine the conclusions
of law reached by the administrative agency. Next it must,
in passing upon constitutional right, decide for itself what
35 H. W. Bikle. "Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6.
36 In Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564 at 569, 37 S. Ct. 701, 61 L. Ed. 1317 (1917),
the court said that "in a question of rate-making there is a strong presumption in
favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body after a
full hearing." See also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
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the facts are. 7 Moreover, it can concern itself with questions
of policy. In doing so, it then becomes an organ for the expression of the popular will. If it cannot clearly see that the
particular problem involved is capable of general occurrence and therefore of generalization, it should not attempt
to pass on the activities of another branch of the government. Only some authoritative legal material or compelling
requirement of justice would warrant the court in doing so. 8
A further method of review consists of examining the
manner in which the administrative body acted. In this
sense judicial review is really trying the administrative trial,
for it passes upon three questions: the good faith of the
agency itself, the regularity or adequacy of its procedure,
and its jurisdiction to act in the matter. Another means of
actually reviewing the administrative decision is for a court
to examine the proceedings and reach a conclusion of its own
where the administrative body has failed to do so or has
reached an erroneous conclusion.
An examination of the decisions dealing with the nature
and scope of judicial review reveals certain reasons which
have influenced the courts in adopting the policy of noninterference with administrative action. In the first place,
we meet the principle that the sovereign state or nation is
supreme and therefore cannot be sued without its consent.
37 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64
L. Ed. 908 (1920); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56
S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
349, 56 S. Ct. 797, 80 L. Ed. 1209 (1936). But see Washington, V. & M. Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142 at 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 81 L. Ed. 965 at
970 (1937), indicating limitation of the doctrine to rate proceedings.
8 See Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927), 168,
where the author says "the courts will overrule administrative discretion whenever it reaches a result inconsistent with some general proposition of law applicable to the entire class of similar cases. We here uncover the real distinction
which lies behind the attempts to distinguish between so-called 'questions of law'
and 'questions of fact' that have everywhere confused the language of the opinions. Where the only ground which a court can give for its difference from the
administrative body is limited to mere difference of opinion as to some matter
or matters peculiar to the case, or some difference in inference, from those
matters, then the court should not disturb the opinion or inference of the factfinding body unless the latter is plainly beyond the bonds of reason; for the
difference is one of discretion or 'fact'. On the other hand, where the ground of
difference between court and fact-finding body can be isolated and expressed as
a general proposition applicable beyond the particular case to all similar cases,
the court, if it holds the proposition one of sound law, must enforce it by overruling the administrative determination."
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Another is that all things are presumed to be done in due
form. A corollary flowing therefrom is that the administrative remedies must be exhausted before a person resorts to
a court. The doctrine of separation of powers also has played
its part. From it emerges the doctrine that a court must not
interfere with the operation of other branches of government.
Moreover, certain decisions are not "judicial" in the constitutional sense of distributing powers according to a tripartite
division. In their nature some of them clearly involve the use
of discretion by nonjudicial officers rather than a determination of law, or, in other words, an application of the law rather
than the making or determination of law. Likewise, findings
of fact are just as clearly administrative functions as they
are judicial or legislative. However, when it is necessary in
a dispute to decide what the law is, a legal question arises
which can properly be presented to a court.3 9
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW

The first question of law which confronts a court in reviewing the decision of an administrative body is that of
the latter's jurisdiction. This is sometimes called the question of ultra vires. The basis of this inquiry is the principle
that an administrative agency must not exceed the power
given it. It must function within the limitations prescribed
for it. No commission obviously should be the final arbiter of
its own authority. Hence it is proper that a lack of jurisdiction should always be subject to collateral attack in a court
of law. If the jurisdiction of the commission depends on the
existence of a certain fact, the commission should not be the
ultimate and unimpeachable judge and jury, so to speak, of
its own power. Therefore it is a judicial question which the
court must decide itself. We thus find that administrative decisions have been set aside by the Supreme Court, not necessarily because the effect thereof would be socially harmful,
but because the commission in question had no legal power to
40
act in the matter. An instance of this is the Raladam case.
39 See Ernst Freund, "The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies,"
27 W. Va. L. Q. 207; Nathan Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 Yale L. J. 781.
40 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S. Ct. 587, 75
L. Ed. 1324 (1931).
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There the court held that the false claims made for a patented
medical article were beyond the power of the Federal Trade
Commission to consider because no competition was involved.
In exercising its power of judicial review, the court is
sometimes confronted by the question of when and what to
review when a specific form of judicial relief is provided by
statute or otherwise. Ordinarily the question of ultra vires is
raised in cases where no review is specified by statute. The
Supreme Court has unanimously held that the extent of
judicial review should be limited to the method selected.4 ' No
quarrel can be found with this attitude.
The question of what amount of evidence should be sufficient for the reviewing court to sustain the administrative
decision is related to the question of when, if at all, the court
should review the order of the commission with respect to
the elements of expediency, reasonableness, discretion, and
application of legal standards. All of these involve questions
of fact. If the decision is fairly reached on a matter of
opinion, expediency, reasonableness, or application of the
facts to a legal standard, it should not be supplanted by a
judicial decision. There is no assurance that the substitution
of the court's reaction to, or application of, the facts is preferable to that of an administrative body. What constitutes
ample facts? The Supreme Court has said:
A finding without substantial evidence to support it-an arbitrary or
capricious finding-does violence to the law. It is without the sanction of
the authority conferred. And an inquiry into the facts before the Commission, in order to ascertain whether its findings are thus vitiated, belongs to the judicial province and does not trench upon, or involve the
42
exercise of, administrative authority.

In this connection, the question arises as to how the reviewing court should act when it finds that there was substantial evidence before the administrative body but that it
does not constitute the weight of the evidence. This last element, namely the value to be given to testimony, may in a
given situation be subject to a reasonable and honest difference of opinion. If the court, looking objectively at the record,
can say that although it personally does not think that the
41 Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 261 U.S. 208, 46 S. Ct. 491, 70
L. Ed. 908 (1926).
42 Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U.S. 266 at 277,
53 S. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166 (1933).
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weight of the evidence was in favor of the administrative
finding there might still be an honest divergence of views on
this subject, then the finding should not be judicially disturbed. A kindred problem is whether the legal effect of the
evidence is a question of law for the court. This again depends on whether there can be a difference of opinion as to
the inference that may properly be drawn from the undisputed evidence. If there is, the court should adopt the version
of fact found by the administrative agency.
Legislative policy is another vital factor for a reviewing
court to keep in mind. Here there is ample opportunity for
the judiciary to serve a useful purpose. The court, therefore,
should scrutinize the statute involved to see whether the
essence of the administrative action is in furtherance of the
legislative function, even though there be no specific enactment on the subject but only a statutory objective expressed.
It sometimes happens that an administrative agency is a
direct arm of the legislature rather than an inherent part of
the executive department. The court in performing its duty
should see that such administrative agencies are free from
improper interference by the executive part of the government. By all means the court should cooperate with the
other political agencies, and, although it should regard them
with understanding and tolerance, should require them at all
times to be responsive to legislative will.
Arbitrary conduct has always been a basis for judicial
review of administrative action. It sometimes happens that
a statute makes possible unreasonable discrimination. Such
an unrestricted authority has been held by some courts to
be unconstitutional while others have felt that the delegation
of the authority is valid, but that if it is exercised unjustly
judicial relief is obtainable."
In the foregoing situation the court should remember
that in constitutional and public law litigation it should not
anticipate any irregularity and thus foreclose a desirable
trial of statutes and administrative orders. If there is an actual threat of a wrong to a person he should have access to
48 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
The
former rule mentioned in the text is applied in People v. Sholem, 294 1lL 204,
128 N.E. 377 (1920), while the latter is followed in Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165,
43 S. Ct 303, 67 L. Ed. 590 (1923).
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the courts, but a mere possibility of wrongful discrimination
without more could swamp court dockets if it were permitted
to be the basis of legal complaint. The court, therefore,
should be reasonably sure that there is actually an injustice
done or quite certain to occur before considering questions
involved in review.
The element of a fair hearing has created much difficulty.
In the discharge of its duties by an administrative tribunal,
if the matter does not require summary treatment, a fair
hearing may be a fundamental requirement of due process of
law. It is difficult to express a general rule. It is not essential, however, that a hearing be given prior to the first order
of an administrative body. If there is a full and fair hearing
before the order becomes effective, due process of law has
been satisfied. Furthermore, unless an impending danger
requires instant action, a statute which makes no provision
for a hearing and grants no opportunity for a review in any
court is invalid."
One workable guide in ascertaining the proper scope of
review of administrative action is the principle that, before
resort can be had to a court, a person must exhaust all his
administrative remedies, unless, because the administrative
agency is prejudiced, doing so would be merely an idle gesture. 45 Keeping in mind that matters before administrative
commissions often have the semblance of adversary litigation and that ordinarily due process demands notice, hearing,
and good faith, we should nevertheless understand that the
problem is rather difficult, involving not only questions of
fairness but sometimes of speed, efficiency, and secrecy.
Moreover, there may be a corrective means within the administrative proceeding itself or a traditional method pursued. 46
44 "Congress in requiring a 'full hearing' had regard to judicial standards,-

not In any technical sense but with respect to those fundamental requirements of
fairness which are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial

nature. .

.

. The answer that the proceeding before the Secretary was not of an

adversary character, as it was not upon complaint but was initiated as a general

inquiry, is futile. .

.

. The proceeding had all the essential elements of contested

litigation. . . . Upon the rates for their services the owners depended for their
livelihood and the proceeding attacked them at a vital spot." Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 at 19-20, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 1129 at 1133 (1938).
45 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938 (1922).
46 Peoria & P. V. R. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 528, 44 S. Ct. 194, 68 L. Ed.
427 (1924); United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 565, 68
L. Ed. 1016 (1924).
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We must always adhere to the rule that no man may be a
judge in his own cause. Therefore, if he is personally interested
in the matter, he cannot exercise any authority there47
in.
An observation as to the manner and extent of review in
cases involving alleged confiscation is here appropriate. If
a public utility rate is too low or unreasonable the courts have
many times considered it an unfounded exercise of power
and accordingly tantamount to a mistake of law. One important fact we should keep in mind is that there is a real difference between fair valuation and confiscatory valuation. A
valuation is confiscatory when it is unfair and unreasonable
and ignores established principles of law, incontestable facts,
or ordinary honesty. 8
A final consideration to be remembered in connection
with the subject of judicial review is the matter of trial and
error, particularly with respect to difficult questions. Occasionally the question of fact involved is extremely close. In a
rate case for example, where there is a difference of opinion
as to the valuation, it is desirable if possible that the rate as
prescribed by the commission should be tried. There are so
many intangible and unpredictable elements entirely beyond
the grasp of both commissions and courts that the stamp of
judicial disapproval should not, if reasonably avoidable, be
placed on many types of administrative action. In a world of
transition, where many of our established practices are being
upset and consequent adjustments are difficult to make, we
should draw on human experience more than on abstract
reason.
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion of the extent to which the courts
should review administrative decisions calls to our attention
the vital but not always obvious fact that in the last analysis
the problem of government are not always simple. The basis
of the whole problem is one of policy. The doctrine of separTumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927).
Interstate Commerce Com. v. Ill. C. R. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155, 54 L. Ed.
280 (1909); Interstate Commerce Com. v. Union Pac. Rd. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 32
S. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308 (1911).
47
48
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ation of powers has been a useful principle of constitutional
law and public administration. Administrative agencies are
necessary to the welfare of the public but should function
within due bounds. The courts by virtue of judicial review
can use or abuse their office as final arbiter of both questions
of law and fact involved in legal disputes. The criterion is
the rule of reason and the protection of individual rights with
a due regard for the public welfare. We should realize as
Holmes once said that "the life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience." 4 9 Mr. Justice Stone reminded his
associates in 1936 that "the only check upon our own exercise
of power is our own sense of self-restraint.""0 The courts can
be influential in maintaining a proper equilibrium between the
various organs of government to the ends that public administration will be efficient and that government will function
for safety rather than speed. In this way the judicial agencies
of society can truly exhibit the possible and worthwhile
attributes of judicial statesmanship." 1
49 Holmes, The Common Law, 1.
50 Dissent in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 at 79, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed.
477 at 495, 102 A.L.R. 914 (1936); see also Corwin, Court over Constitution (1938),
Ch. 1.
51 For interesting discussions of the problem discussed in this article, see two
essays entitled, "To What Extent Should Decisions of Administrative Bodies Be
Reviewable by the Courts?" 25 A.B.A.J. 453 by Malcolm McDermott and ibid. 543
by Charles B. Stephens. See also J. Landis, The Administrative Process.

